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Abstract
The aim of the chapter is to examine thoroughly the aspects connected with risk manage-
ment in complex organisations; it starts with the consideration of theoretical models of 
accident’s analysis in which the accident is attributable not so much to a single worker’s 
malpractice, but rather to deficiencies in the whole organisational structure for the devel-
opment and control of processes, and concludes with the concept of the ‘resilient sys-
tem’, i.e. dynamic organisations in which the very idea of safety and its applications in 
the objective context evolve and adapt to the changes in situation by learning from their 
mistakes. With this in mind, the chapter aims to emphasize that actions, practices, pro-
cedures and controls, as well as human relationships, communication, managerial and 
organisational policies, incentives, disincentives and reward and penalization system, are 
all determining factors in the reduction of risk and should consequently all be taken into 
account in the logical process of continuous improvement which is fundamental to any 
virtuous system.
Keywords: risk management, complex organisations, work accidents, accident’s 
analysis, Swiss Cheese Model, resilient system
1. Introduction
Since the mid-nineteenth century, with the advent of so-called ‘mass industrialisation’ and 
the subsequent birth of capitalist society, in most industrialised countries, we have witnessed 
the spread of complex political and cultural phenomena. These juxtaposed on the one hand 
entrepreneurs, who were seeking to maximise the profits made possible by newly introduced 
production technologies, and the working class, which became a victim of the increased cost 
of living associated with meagre wages and working conditions that were often inhumane 
and in which it was forced to operate. This led to the inescapable necessity for workers to join 
forces to deal with the ‘contractual dictatorship’ of entrepreneurs, drawing the attention of 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
the public authorities and stimulating them to intervene in the enactment of laws to protect 
workers, not only in terms of their wages, but also to safeguard their physical integrity.
This led to the spread in most industrialised countries of the first laws to protect the health 
and safety of workers. However, for many years, these laws were merely designed to provide 
compensation to the injured, because they were intended as a tool to ‘repair the damage’ 
rather than focusing on implementing preventive measures aimed at reducing the number 
and severity of accidents [1]. The latter in fact were mostly considered, according to the cul-
ture of the time, as the result of fatality, or in other words, as the unavoidable consequence 
of the advent of mass industrialisation that had led to the spread of increasingly effective but 
potentially hazardous production technologies.
It would take another few decades (starting from the middle of the last century) for the public 
authorities to realise the need to implement a preventive system that would aim to reduce the 
occurrence of injuries rather than to limit their consequences in a mere logic of compensation. 
The new preventive approach paved the way for the creation of that branch of knowledge 
related to the study of injury dynamics linked to the spread of increasingly sophisticated 
production technologies, as well as increasingly complex business management and organ-
isational systems. The aim of these was to find new operational tools of management that 
could contribute significantly to reducing accidents and thereby ensuring healthier and more 
efficient working conditions in terms of costs and expected results.
The same preventive approach has undergone a deep conceptual evolution since its birth, shift-
ing from considering injuries as a consequence of the spread of increasingly sophisticated and 
dangerous production technologies (1950s–1960s) towards a view of injuries as the result of 
man’s failure, unable to operate safely (1970s–1980s), and eventually leading to more modern 
interpretations of organisational and cultural kind (1990s–2000s). The latter were implemented 
in more recent years based on analyses that focused on the interactions between man and the 
environment in which he operates, and between technology and its practical use. This was 
done by establishing rules and procedures where man is considered the main actor who con-
ceives, designs, implements and manages the whole organisation, interacting with machines 
and with others through communication and social and interpersonal relationships [2].
The 1950s, therefore, have seen the birth of the first major series of studies on risk and safety 
management in the workplace, as a result of the rapid industrial and technological develop-
ments of the post-war period. As we have seen, these studies focused mainly on the fail-
ure of technology and then on the design and construction of technological artefacts [3]. 
According to this perspective, preventing injury was to be achieved by improving the reli-
ability of industrial machines and their accessibility, and by reducing the ‘residual risk’, that 
is, making them ultimately safer. The machine, placed at the centre of the organisational and 
productive system, guaranteed the success of the corporate mission. In other words, it was 
seen as having the ability to stand up to the market, to be competitive and to progress. Based 
on this viewpoint where everything revolved around the technology, man also became less 
important. The worker was seen as the mere executor of practical actions that were often 
repetitive and insignificant compared to what the machine was capable of doing. As a result, 
even with regard to injuries, man was rarely seen as being directly responsible for what 
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happened, whereas the responsibility was rather attributed to the machine in terms of their 
lack of reliability and safety. Accidents, as a matter of fact, were often a result of malfunction-
ing equipment and technologies, as well as deficiencies in the working methods associated 
with them. Fires, explosions and failures were frequent and the ‘residual risk’ inherent in 
each machine was very high. Reducing injuries would have been possible by improving the 
design and development of new technologies, making them more reliable and safe by imple-
menting their reliability and by adopting effective security systems that would make the 
occurrence of accidents less likely.
Twenty years later, starting with the 1970s, scholars began to look for the root causes of acci-
dents no longer solely in the dangerousness of machinery and work equipment, but rather 
in the failure (mistakes) of workers [3]. In fact, technological progress had evolved very 
quickly and the result was that more reliable and safer machinery, equipment and systems 
had become available. Even the so-called ‘residual risk’, i.e. the one considered acceptable in 
relation to the context and the complexity of the machine operated, had dropped consider-
ably, thanks to the introduction of technical standards that required a careful analysis of the 
potential hazards during the design stage.
Then why were accidents still occurring? The answer according to scholars was to blame 
man: if an accident happened, it is because man operated the machine improperly. This 
shift of perspective was favoured by the idea that only by looking at the individual causes, 
it is possible to come to an understanding of the factors that caused the accident [4]. This 
approach is based on the individual blame logic, namely on a ‘accusatory perspective that focuses 
on the errors and omissions of individuals, with the belief that expert actors wouldn’t make mistakes’ 
[5]. Human nature, therefore, is not seen as inherently fallible, but the idea is that we can 
think that the action of man can be compared to that of machines, and as such demand the 
same reliability from it. If an operator has been properly trained and has sufficient experi-
ence, he will not make mistakes!
This claim, as will be seen later, is partly true because man by his very nature will never be 
infallible. However, he will approach infallibility to the extent that he is put in the position 
to operate at his best, which will be linked not only to his level of training and familiarity in 
operating with the machine, but also become possible by having considered the production 
system as a whole, designing machines in line with the operational needs of those who oper-
ate them. However, in those years, the efforts to deal with injuries (which were seen mainly 
as a result of human errors) were directed at people ‘in the front line’, pinning the ‘blame’ 
on someone and then removing the ‘bad apples’. The person approach followed a logic of 
disciplinary type that did not involve any intervention at a systemic level, but that rather 
triggered a ‘blame culture’, which as we will see later is not conducive to the identification of 
errors, and as such, ‘prevents the system to monitor the critical issues, learn from its mistakes and 
improve as a whole’ [5]. The person approach, therefore, focuses on actions, the direct source of 
the errors, whereas these same actions are seen as stemming from aberrant mental processes 
such as forgetfulness, carelessness, negligence or imprudence [6]. In this way, the errors and 
accidents, but also the so-called ‘near misses’, are read and investigated as the direct result of 
the characteristics of human nature.
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Later, in the late 1980s, a different perspective emerged, referred to as the socio-technical 
culture. This is an innovative approach that investigates the causes of errors and accidents by 
analysing the interaction between human and technical factors [7, 8].
The underlying assumption of the new socio-technical perspective is that accidents are caused 
by shortcomings and flaws in the controls and measures are put in place by the organisation 
to curb risky events [5, 9–11]. According to this approach, individual actors are frequently the 
heirs of the system’s flaws. It follows that efforts to remedy those errors should be directed to 
the organisation as a whole, in order to improve the defences and remove its pitfalls [5]. The 
socio-technical perspective also helps the spread of the culture of safety, promoting organ-
isational learning and improving the organisation through both reactive and proactive meth-
ods [12]. Organisational accidents result from the concatenation of several latent factors that 
contribute to the event and that originate at the different levels of the system [13, 14]. The 
socio-technical approach, therefore, considers ‘the system’, understood as the manufacturing 
organisation as a whole, as the real culprit of failure, and within the system man is seen only 
as one of several elements that have contributed to causing the error. With this perspective, 
we understand how actions, practices, procedures and controls, but also human relationships, 
communication, managerial and organisational policies, incentives and disincentives, and 
rewarding and punitive systems, are all factors that determine the success or failure of the 
entire organisation. This is true both in terms of production and the safety of workers, and 
these factors all need to be considered in the logic of continuous improvement that underlies 
every virtuous system.
This logic is the defining backbone of the latest studies, which examine the cognitive and 
organisational processes, here seen as favouring the reliability of organisations, reducing 
errors and improving safety conditions [15, 16] but also, as we will see later, of other studies 
linked to Resilient Engineering, where the organisational systems are seen as dynamic pro-
cesses that must continually adapt to achieve their goals, react to changes in the environment 
and manage unexpected events.
In this sense, safety is conceived as an emergent property of the system, as well as derived 
from the interactions between the social and technical components of an organisation [17, 18].
Ultimately, it is impossible not to note that the study of injury dynamics has led, hand in 
hand with the evolution of socio-technical organisational models, to the growth of the science 
known as ‘Ergonomics’, into which several fields of study have converged, such as psychol-
ogy, medicine and engineering [19].
More specifically, we have seen the evolution of ‘cognitive ergonomics’, which aims to study the 
interaction between individuals and technology through the development of models and tools 
for predicting human error, reducing mental workload and to provide guidelines for designing 
machines that take into account the limited possibilities of the human cognitive system [20].
We ultimately have returned to focusing the attention on the machines, not only to improve their 
inherent reliability, eliminating the hazards and reducing ‘residual risks’, but also rather trying to 
design them with the person who will then use them in mind, so that the user cannot make mis-
takes. In other words, the machine, operating tool and equipment, but also the organisation as a 
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whole, are designed and manufactured to suit the needs of man, starting with what are his weak-
nesses and helping him prevent mistakes. ,se ‘intelligent’ designs are, for example, equipment 
items made with clearly different shapes and colours, depending on how they are to be used; 
tools that do not allow their operation in potentially hazardous or unsuitable sites; conspicuously 
diversified bottles designed to contain different substances; machines that do not permit incor-
rect settings or operation; and robots that are an aid to man in production, helping him to carry 
out operations with pinpoint precision, well beyond common human potential. In this case the 
tool, equipment, housing, container and the very machine mould and characterise themselves, 
seeking to meet the needs of their users as closely as possible, considering such weaknesses as: 
distraction, tiredness, stress, limited vision or inattention.
2. Risk management in complex socio-technical systems
A socio-technical system is nothing more than an organisation made up of people (human 
resources, which are the company’s personal organism) and technologies (instrumental and 
production means). It is the interaction between man and production technology, as well as 
between man and man, that allows the system to operate, transforming input elements into 
outputs of potential interest to the market [21, 22].
We could compare the business to a human body, where there is a brain that plans, manages and 
sorts, in order to pursue the objectives, ideas and ‘mission’. The inputs are given by the brain 
and through neural connections they reach the various organs that make up the human being, 
thus allowing the action, namely the achievement of planned goals. This synergy between the 
decision-making organ and the executive organs allows the human being to act, performing 
tasks of various kinds, from seemingly simple ones such as eating, walking or talking, to more 
complex ones such as practising a sport, learning a trade or playing a musical instrument.
In corporate organisations, the brain can be represented by the senior management, or by the 
person or people who being at the top of the organisation define the production strategies, 
ultimately defining the ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘how much’ and ‘when’ to produce a specific output, 
which is the result of the business objectives and strategies. From senior management, orders 
branch out and through a variety of communication channels (similar to neuronal connec-
tions), the inputs reach the departments responsible for the action, i.e. the production units. 
By doing so, through a series of actions involving men, tools, technologies and know-how, the 
idea takes shape and materialises in the finished product, i.e. in that output that reflects, or 
should reflect, the goals, ideas and design requirements established by senior management.
A system organised in this way can therefore be more or less complex, and its complexity will have 
repercussions on the organisational, procedural and management capacities that allow it to oper-
ate, including those responsible for the safety and well-being of the people who work there [23].
Where does the complexity of a socio-technical system of this kind reside? It resides in the num-
ber and typology of the elements that form it and in their interactions, staring from the people 
who are part of it, as well as the technologies involved and the manufacturing system used.
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However, there is a special feature that clearly distinguishes a complex socio-technical system 
from a human being. Man’s complexity is not tied to the probability of making mistakes, as 
is the case, instead, in the socio-technical system, in which the interdependence between the 
various component parts is often the cause of the sometimes unexpected failure of his work.
As a matter of fact, it is precisely the intrinsic complexity of the human being, the result of mil-
lions of years of evolution, that gives him a better chance to succeed in carrying out complex 
actions and that ultimately is what sets him apart from animals and makes him a superior 
being, guaranteeing the conservation and dominance of the species.
Humans make mistakes, of course, but the mistakes they make (which are the fruit as we 
will see later several factors such as: inexperience, distraction, incompetence, difficulty of the 
action to be taken, etc.) do not stem from the intrinsic complexity of the human being. Playing 
the piano, for example, is an obviously complex action that requires coordination, motor 
skills, rhythmic sense, concentration and knowledge of music and the instrument. However, 
what enables man to play the piano is precisely the fact that he has evolved into a complex 
organism, in which the parts of the system participate in unison to the action’s execution. 
Each element moves in harmony with the others, thereby ensuring the same level of concen-
tration, coordination and commitment, and reacting similarly to external stimuli.
The human being is composed of a myriad of different cells and the brain itself is made up of 
cells grouped into several distinct parts, each of which is responsible for overseeing different 
functions. However, everything is coordinated properly in order to ensure that the processes 
responsible for carrying out an action move in unison in the same direction, pursuing the 
same objectives and eliminating the unpredictability of the consequences of their behaviour, 
have a clear understanding of the ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘how much’ and ‘when’ to take a specific 
action. This complexity ultimately becomes a successful weapon.
The parts of a socio-technical system are also designed to work together to achieve the com-
mon goal. This interdependence, however, as mentioned, despite being led by a single vertex 
consisting of a small group of elements, cannot reach the same levels of synergy, harmony 
and coordination in sharing a common purpose, intent and goals, as is the case for the ele-
ments that form the human body. Therefore, the number of elements making up a socio-tech-
nical system increases their complexity and, consequently, the likelihood of failure, including 
the unpredictability of the consequences of its actions.
In literature, we find three types of interdependencies between the components of a socio-
technical system: the ‘generic’, the ‘sequential’ and the ‘reciprocal’. These refer to exchanges 
of the inputs and outputs of each unit and in a way also define their complexity and the 
potential organisational interferences [24]. With the exception of generic interdependence, in 
which a compartment or a branch of an organisation typically has full spatial, organisational 
and decisional independence, and its dependence to the system lies objectively only in the fact 
that its survival in the market is linked to the survival of the parent company or the partner, in 
the other two, instead, the interdependence is more restrictive. This is because in the sequen-
tial kind, a system unit’s output becomes an input for another, and in the reciprocal kind, they 
continuously exchange inputs and outputs in order to add value to the finished product. In 
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this order, the three types of interdependencies have increasing difficulties of coordination, as 
they contain an increasing degree of complexity, constraints and uncertainties.
In this light, it is clear how often the safety level guaranteed to a process cannot be separated 
from what is established in a different process and how ultimately many of the errors that 
cause a failure in terms of safety can arise from objectives that are not shared in common by 
the different parts that make up the system, or from the difficulty of working in synergy, as is 
the case, instead, between the parts that form the human body.
The time factor, for example, is one of the elements that most often contributes to the occur-
rence of an injury. Operating in a hurry on a tight schedule reduces the safety margins, caus-
ing an increased likelihood of making mistakes. As such, it is essential to guarantee each 
component of the system the time needed to safely perform its actions under a single supervi-
sor/manager that manages time as a resource fairly, effectively and efficiently. However, in 
reality, this often does not happen and some processes are carried out in a time that is not 
appropriate to guarantee that they are accomplished safely.
Leaving aside the case where a worker or group of workers decide independently and without 
a valid reason to act in a hurry, the reason why this happens is to be found in any of the follow-
ing: the former might lie in the fact that the time estimated by management to complete the pro-
cess has not been properly planned out from the beginning; the second that upsets have altered 
the schedule for the process, which are in turn due to predictable or totally unexpected events.
Ultimately, therefore, in the first case, the resource was incorrectly quantified, while in the 
second case, an unexpected or unpredictable event occurred during the course of operations 
that has changed the surrounding conditions.
Looking at the first case, the question is: why did management miscalculate the timing of 
the process? The answer is often to be sought precisely in the inherent complexity of socio-
technical systems, starting from the analysis of the people and processes that influenced the 
final decision.
Contrary to what happens to the constituent parts of the human body, which as we have seen, 
work in perfect synergy with the objective of ensuring the proper functioning of the whole 
organism, in the case of socio-technical systems the parts involved, at times, pull in opposite 
or conflicting directions, without being able to find an effective compromise. Reducing the 
production time, for example, is a goal of the management to cut down on costs. Therefore, 
the final decision may have been biased towards the goal of maximising profits, rather than 
to act according to high safety standards, underestimating the consequences that this may 
involve for the entire system.
Obviously, the greater the number of components in the system acting to pursue different 
objectives, the greater is the possible errors caused by incorrect mediation between the inter-
ests at stake. It is not uncommon that different objectives of the parts of the same system lead 
to inaccurate choices regarding the resources made available, which, therefore, will be to the 
benefit of one or more of the parts and to the detriment of others, with obvious repercussions 
on the management, organisation and safety of the latter [25].
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The second reason that may have led to the shortage of time necessary to complete the process 
safely, instead, stems from the sequential or reciprocal interdependence between processes.
This is the case in which, for example, an unexpected delay in procurement has led to less time 
being available to complete the processes, i.e. disruptions have occurred that have changed 
the conditions originally forecast when designing and analysing the work stages.
The complexity of the system as a whole such as the number of procurement sources required 
for the completion of the process, the number of variables which in turn have influenced the 
timing of implementation of each of the procurement processes, as well as the procedure for 
the exchange of output and input elements between processes are just some of the factors that 
may have determined the problem.
As mentioned, sometimes the problem is predictable and therefore the system should be aware 
of the consequences it entails and should have already planned the corrective actions. At other 
times, instead, the problem is not predictable or is considered so remote as not to require a 
detailed plan of the actions envisioned to tackle it. This is especially true of complex systems, in 
which not everything can be planned in detail, since many of the elements that make up the sys-
tem involve a high degree of behavioural unpredictability. In this case, the key to success for the 
organisation lies in being able to react quickly to the unexpected event by enforcing immediate 
compensatory measures to avoid the error, even if these measures were not originally planned 
and it is not possible to act according to a predetermined and well-tested pattern [18].
It is evident, however, that the complexity of the system, influenced not only by the number of 
elements that form it, but also by the number of variables that it handles, increases the prob-
ability in generating unexpected events. For these reasons, it is strategically important that the 
same system be able to react quickly to the unexpected events, applying those compensatory 
strategies that enable it to prevent the deviance from becoming a source of failure.
This is what, as will be seen later, is identified as the organisation’s resilience or, in other 
words, the capacity of complex socio-technical systems that makes them capable, besides 
planning in detail the processes and procedures that can ensure that synergy of purposes and 
intent necessary to coordinate the various parts that form it, also to respond effectively to the 
unexpected event, being flexible and able to adapt to changing operating conditions, in order 
to find the key to success even when external elements intervene to disrupt the plan.
Sometimes the risk in a complex organisation can arise due to the fact that its components are 
ignorant of what the other production units have done, in spite of having shared resources 
such as the workspace or technology, and as such spurring harmful interferences.
It is well-known, in fact, that most workplaces operating simultaneously increase system per-
formance as a whole, allowing it to manufacture the product in less time to the benefit the 
majority of stakeholders. It is therefore normal that one or more system components will push 
for streamlining the workspaces and production times, opting for actions that are carried out 
simultaneously in the same space. However, it is also a known fact that the sources of many 
events of injury are overlapping stages that occur in confined spaces, which consequently 
increase the risk of interference.
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This is the case, for example, in large construction sites, places where multiple businesses 
often are working at the same time and that belong to the same socio-technical system respon-
sible for completing the work, but each focused on its own activity and often unaware of what 
the other companies on site are doing. A general supervision that allows for the best coordina-
tion of these activities and that is able to mediate between diversified needs, guaranteeing that 
each has appropriate resources in order to produce its best, is what is necessary to ensure that 
the parts involved are driven to act in the common interest, avoiding that the actions of one 
can adversely affect the other [26].
The simultaneous presence of companies with different interests that are competing in the 
choice of technologies can sometimes generate system failures and increase the risk for the 
safety of those who work there. A technological resource that is not appropriate to execute a 
specific process is, indeed, another factor that often contributes to the occurrence of accidents.
Leaving aside the hypothesis of deliberately reckless choices, for which the identification of 
technological resources is the result of flagrant violations of safety rules, a department could 
find itself working with equipment that is unsuitable for the work and therefore potentially 
dangerous, seeing it was chosen based on considerations arising from conflicting interests 
within the organisation.
There are several examples of this. Sometimes a technology is inadequate simply because it is out-
dated. Conflicting interests of the system’s parts, in fact, could lead to the company not replacing 
old equipment, which although possessing the minimal security requirements to ensure compli-
ance with the applicable technical laws and regulations, do not guarantee the same levels of reli-
ability, safety and ergonomics of more modern machines. The reasons for not replacing the fleet of 
machines are often economic in nature and sometimes linked to investment planning, depreciation 
or the accumulation of capital, or the occasional use of the resource does not justify the upgrade to 
new machinery, or more simply, because the company does not have the necessary funds.
In other cases, which find their source in the mediation of different interests of the system’s 
parts, a technological resource is pushed to produce to the limit of its operational capacity 
precisely because of the need to maximise the yield. This brings the process to always work on 
the borderline of what is an acceptable residual risk and a high risk, a bit like what happens 
with Formula 1 race cars, that are driven always to the limit.
At other times, instead, the error is generated by sharing a technological resource and the 
simultaneous need of the different system’s components to use it. This is the case for example 
of machines or equipment that are used for multiple tasks and that consequently require con-
tinuous changes to the settings, programming and configuration, because of the need from 
time to time to adapt their operation to the needs of those who use them. There is no doubt 
that this type of choices could prove to be strategic in the intent of streamlining the use of 
resources, meeting the needs of some of the system’s stakeholders. But, on the other hand, 
the need for frequent actions to change the settings or operating modes represents another 
source of possible error and the characteristic elements of a complex production system that 
is constantly called to mediate between different needs at the risk of increasing the likelihood 
of a mistake and ultimately its vulnerability.
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The above are only a few examples of how the complexity of the socio-technical system—
understood not only as number and variability of the elements that form it, but also as dif-
ferent concurring objectives, as well as the unpredictability of the actions and reactions of the 
system’s elements—might increase the instability of the system as a whole, generating those 
internal deviations that are the source of the error [27].
Ultimately, we cannot fail to mention the complex nature of the people belonging to the socio-
technical system, though this time not as elements of the system responsible for monitoring 
parts of it or, in other words, as those who act in the interests of the process they manage, 
pursuing objectives that are sometimes common and sometimes conflicting, but to the people 
as such, understood as human beings and as workers.
We have mentioned that the complexity of the socio-technical system arises from the com-
plexity of the elements that form it. As is known, there is nothing more complex and unpre-
dictable than human behaviour.
In the comparison between the human body and a corporate system, the people who form a 
company are likened to the parts of the body, each of them specialized in performing a cer-
tain function and in a continuous relationship of exchanging with the other. The parts of the 
human body, however, always act as planned, not introducing random variables when carry-
ing out the actions planned. A system of this kind, therefore, achieves that harmony between 
the parts that allows it more easily to operate in full synergy.
Every individual, by contrast, is different from another. Everyone has his/her own personal-
ity traits that influence the behaviours and relationships with others and has different needs 
and reacts differently to external stimuli. It is true that a person’s actions in practice follow 
what has been established by the organisation, with the aim of achieving the common goal. It 
is true that training, a culture of safety, work practices and procedures, as well as orders and 
controls, incentives and disincentives, besides practice, simulations and exercises, represent 
elements that guarantee that every human resource of the system acts in accordance with the 
established rules, in the time and manner required, and in harmony with the surrounding 
environment. But it is equally true that man is neither a robot nor his is behaviour similar 
to that of a cell in the body. Man acts always preserving that intellectual independence, the 
result of complex biochemical reactions at work within him, which are in turn influenced 
by past experience, personal convictions, the culture in which he grew up, the society in 
which he operates and the behaviours of others, and which ultimately make him unique and 
unpredictable.
It is also true that in the uniqueness and unpredictability of the human being also lies his 
genius, the ability to tackle new problems, to handle the unexpected and to act outside the box 
to find effective solutions even in the event of a problem or emergency [28]. Man, therefore, 
is the strength in the management of complex systems, the key asset to rely on in order to 
develop systems that are able to ensure success, regardless of their degree of internal com-
plexity and of the number of constraints or instability.
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3. Seeking the causes of failure: reason’s model
The analysis of the dynamics at the origin of an injury shows that a single error is rarely suf-
ficient to generate the failure, i.e. to lead to serious consequences for the system. Rather, a 
failure is the result of a chain of latent errors, which can be attributed directly to the human 
resources that form the system or the technologies available to it, but which are often under-
estimated by those who make them or who monitor them, not paying due attention to find 
a solution to them [29]. The theory of errors has evolved hand in hand with the develop-
ment of complex socio-technical systems, trying to explain, at least ideally, how they are 
not merely the fruit of incomplete or incorrect human activities, but rather the end result 
of a series of events (latent errors), accepting the existence for each accident that occurs of 
many near miss events.
It is based on these principles that in 1990, James Reason proposed a model to explain the 
dynamics of accidents, adopting a logic which, although a bit outdated nowadays, continues 
to provide a good pattern for understanding the genesis of accidents in complex systems 
[30]. Reason’s model is also called the Swiss Cheese Model, as it is portrayed as a set of slices 
of cheese, each of which represents a defensive layer put in place by the organisation to 
prevent the occurrence of an adverse event. These barriers, however, contain holes, typical 
of Swiss cheese, which represent the errors, both active (slips and lapses) or run-time errors 
related primarily to man, and latent (mistakes), which originate from bugs in the design or 
organisation and overall from the systemic management of the organisational reality [31]. 
The adverse event will occur only if the holes of the various slices of cheese are aligned 
along a ‘trajectory of opportunity’ or, in other words, if we encounter a series of active and 
latent errors that will prevent the barriers to be really effective, thereby leaving room for the 
occurrence of the ‘top event’, understood as an accident. This model, although not immune 
to criticism, is able to represent what happens in most circumstances when an adverse event 
occurs, linking the responsibility for what happened to a deeper analysis of the entire organ-
isational system. The model groups the barriers (slices of cheese) in four different types 
that are associated with four different ‘mistakes’. The last barriers are bypassed by those 
mistakes that directly caused the accident or so-called ‘Unsafe Acts’, final errors typically 
made by the operator or caused by the technology malfunctioning at the end of the process.
If we run the chain of events from end to top, we find that these errors are often favoured by 
‘Preconditions for Unsafe Acts’ or conditions that favoured the performance of the unsafe act 
or the malfunction in general, and for which insufficient barriers were placed, i.e. the neces-
sary organisational and technical measures to prevent their occurrence. We then have so-
called ‘Unsafe Supervisions’, that is, errors made by those who were supposed to supervise 
the actions of others, guaranteeing success, to arrive at ‘Organisational Influences’ i.e. those 
systemic deficiencies inherent within the complex organisation.
The application of this model, therefore, allows us to have a clearer view of what happened 
in the event of an accident, according to the logic of not stopping to consider only recent 
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episodes of the process that led to the failure, but pushing the analyst to conduct a deeper 
search, leading him backwards in the investigation of the systemic preconditions inherent in 
the organisation itself.
In light of the above, below I provide an example of the application of Reason’s model to a 
case that actually occurred, in which the analysis of the origins of the error allows broader 
considerations as to the evolution of the events, and consequently identifying also the remote 
causes of the failure.
The case: a lady is hospitalised due to a neoplasia with ovarian metastasis at a clinic spe-
cialising in the treatment of cancer. Following analyses in the Department of Gynaecology-
Oncology, the doctors suggest an ovarian surgery followed by chemotherapy. The lady 
accepts and after the surgery, which was also perfectly successful, begins the first cycle of 
chemotherapy. The trainee specialist issues the prescription for the chemotherapy drug based 
on instructions from the doctor in charge of the unit, who, in addition to the therapeutic 
treatment, also prescribes a protective drug to reduce the toxic effects of chemotherapy. The 
head doctor makes a mistake writing the dose of the protective drug, confusing a comma and 
prescribing a dose equal to one tenth of the one prescribed by the trainee specialist. In the 
ward, the prescription is not checked and the lady starts the therapy. Four days later, she is 
hospitalised due to chronic kidney failure, reporting deafness and displaying obvious signs 
of intoxication from the chemotherapy drug. She is immediately put on dialysis and dies 
18 months later due to complications with the dialysis. A superficial analysis of the accident 
would lead to focus solely on the events directly related to the occurrence of the error, i.e. the 
fact that the trainee specialist wrote the wrong dose indicated to him by the head doctor and 
therefore making the mistake that proved fatal.
Reason’s model applied to this case allows us to identify, by tracing the events backwards, 
all those barriers in the system that did not work, either because not working, not present, 
removed or purposely bypassed by the chain of events.
The model starts by considering the ‘Unsafe act’, that is, the last mistake, which in this case 
was made by the trainee specialist. This error can be caused, as we shall see in detail later, by 
a number of reasons related to the individual, including lack of training, negligence, incom-
petence or wilful misconduct. In any case, these reasons are tied with the last action, i.e. the 
one directly involved in the failure, but that does not consider the accident as a whole. The 
model, as said, looks deeper, considering the ‘Preconditions for Unsafe Acts’, that is, the pre-
conditions of the health socio-technical system that were supposed to limit the occurrence of 
‘unsafe acts’ but that instead have determined the conditions that led to the error. In the case 
we have just examined, the trainee specialist evidently is still not sufficiently familiar with 
the correct doses of the drug to prescribe for him to notice the error that he is committing 
and therefore cannot correct it, so that his actions should have been monitored by someone 
who had more experience. Another precondition that encourages the mistake, typical of the 
academic world (but other fields as well), is that the trainee specialist (a student) probably 
did not feel like asking the head doctor for an explanation about the dose communicated to 
him a second time. It is typical of students, in fact, to think that asking for an explanation 
about something that is likely considered ‘common ground’ or ‘obvious’ is a ‘dumb question’, 
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because they would see it as tarnishing their reputation, as well as proving an embarrassment 
in the eyes of fellow specialists. This means that to the simple question: ‘excuse me, did you 
say grams or milligrams?’ out of shyness, awe or fear to lose face, the student prefers to keep 
silent, thus causing the error to propagate.
The relationship between a student and professor, considered a ‘precondition for unsafe acts’ 
would broaden the analysis to sociological, psychological and communicative considerations, 
also taking into account human relationships and psychosocial risks that could affect the evo-
lution of events.
These dynamics related to interpersonal relationships and effective communication are well 
known to air force operators, who since the 1970s have created and adopted a system called 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) [32] with the aim of facilitating communication at all lev-
els, in view of the fact that the analysis of injury events pointed to the fact that in several cases 
of accidents, at least one member of the crew had spotted an abnormal event, but without, 
however, being able to communicate it effectively to the commander [33]. This management 
system focuses on the prevention of human error and consists of a set of principles and behav-
ioural and attitudinal models that offer everyone the opportunity to examine and improve 
their behaviour. Specifically, CRM aims to foster a climate or culture where authority may be 
respectfully questioned. This is a delicate subject for many organisations, especially ones with 
traditional hierarchies, so appropriate communication techniques must be taught to supervi-
sors and their subordinates, so that supervisors understand that the questioning of authority 
need not be threatening, and subordinates understand the correct way to question orders. 
Another possible ‘precondition for unsafe acts’ is the one connected to the analysis of the 
environment in which the actions that caused the error were carried out. It is well known that 
noisy environments where there is a lot of confusion or there are possible distractions tend to 
be conducive to errors. In light of this fact, the Sentara Hospital in Virginia introduced an area 
near the drug dispensers called ‘no interruption zone’, in which it is absolutely forbidden to 
speak. This is meant to avoid possible distractions from the nurses responsible for choosing 
the drug and is a solution that significantly reduces errors due to the improper administration 
of drugs [34]. Tracing our way back in the analysis of events, we find barriers in the system 
regarding ‘Supervisions’, which are the tasks involved in monitoring actions. The head doc-
tor should have double-checked the prescription filled out by the trainee specialist before 
signing it, as he should have been aware of the chances of him making a mistake, precisely 
because he is a student. Double-checking also happens to be an effective and widespread tool 
in a complex socio-technical system because of how efficient it is at avoiding mistakes. This is 
a standard procedure in the most critical processes, where the consequences of an error may 
have a strong impact in terms of damage. A doctor or other specialist double-checking the 
prescription would alone have been enough to put in place an effective barrier to the error, 
thus avoiding its spread. Even in this case, though, probably due to lack of time, incompe-
tence, or excessive confidence in the trainee’s skills, this was not done and the prescription 
was passed on to the ward as if it were correct. At the level of ‘Unsafe Supervisions’, we need 
also to underline the lack of controls in the ward. Here too, the ‘barrier to error’, i.e. the safety 
procedure, would require a doctor in the ward to check the prescribed therapy a second time 
when defining the health protocol. But again, unfortunately, no one did, leading the nurse to 
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administer the wrong dose of the drug. At the level of ‘Organisational Influences’, that is, with 
reference to those systemic deficiencies inherent in the organisation, as mentioned, we have to 
seek the remote causes that led to the primary conditions for the occurrence of the accident. In 
this case, it should be noted that the head doctor is the only person authorised by the organisa-
tion to issue prescriptions for medical treatment, as he is the person who signs the protocol. 
This procedure is aimed to avoid possible errors of misunderstanding on the quantities or the 
names of prescribed drugs from the get-go. As we have seen, however, this did not happen. 
One possible reason can likely be the constraint to save time. Independently of considerations 
that are specific to our example, in which the doctor may have deliberately committed the irre-
sponsible acts he is blamed for solely due to negligence or because he intentionally decided 
to break the rules, from a systemic point of view, not having enough time to perform one’s 
duties, as we have already discussed, is a symptom of an inefficient organisation that is often 
understaffed and forces employees to work on taxing shifts and with excessive workloads.
A corporate reorganisation that better factors the activities to be performed together with 
the resources to be used, encouraging mobility, dynamism, waste reduction and resource 
optimisation, and that ultimately promotes ‘continuous improvement’ through the continued 
implementation of its processes, is often the decisive response in limiting the conditions that 
are conducive to the errors. Probably, in a more relaxed environment and with more time, 
the treatment plan would have been filled out correctly or would have been checked by the 
head doctor, avoiding the error’s occurrence. At a systemic level, we again need to consider 
the ‘wrong practice’ or approval of inappropriate behaviours as if they were normal, which, 
as we will see later in the systemic and organisational theories related to failure, is what often 
takes the name of ‘normalisation of deviance’.
Everyone knows it is not allowed to have trainees issue prescriptions, much less (but as we 
unfortunately see happening in some healthcare facilities) to have them carry out complex 
tasks such as making diagnoses or prescribing treatments without proper supervision from 
the head doctor. But, again, we unfortunately see this happen in many healthcare facilities 
around the world, where interns replace doctors, as a way to cope with the chronic shortage 
of staff that often plagues many healthcare systems.
A risk inherent in the blind acceptance of the Swiss Cheese Model, however, is to make the 
assumption that the more slices of cheese are placed in sequence, the better the chance of 
avoiding errors. This assumption translates into the organisation having as a priority the need 
to implement as many defences as possible without, though, considering the repercussions 
that this can entail for the reliability of the whole system, such as the emergence of new prob-
lems (failure mode, directed or caused by interactions between the barriers) [35]. For example, 
theories on the reliability of regularly servicing machines and plants view disassembling the 
machine or plant and then inspecting and reassembling its components as being certainly 
effective and therefore a barrier to error (failure/breakage). Performing such maintenance tasks 
undoubtedly increases the number of barriers (slices of cheese), as it allows staff to thoroughly 
inspect the machine/plant for possible faults or conditions that could lead to a possible system 
failure. According to the assumptions inherent in Reason’s model, this practice ensures greater 
reliability to the system. In reality, however, the result is not always an increase in reliability, 
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because when disassembling and inspecting the components, the errors that can occur when 
having to reassemble them also increase. The new barrier (slice of cheese) must indeed be 
viewed as a defence, but also as a possible source of holes on other slices of cheese, holes that 
initially were not present but that were caused by the introduction of the new slice. Another 
limitation of Reason’s model is to consider errors as resident system pathogens, similarly to 
how we consider viruses in the human body when they have not yet manifested their harm-
fulness or, in other words, as harmful entities that can actually wake up suddenly and cause a 
disease in the body [35]. This assumption does not actually always reflect what is happening in 
the genesis of the error in complex socio-technical systems, because viruses are purely harmful 
agents, while the actions that the system performs and that can lead to failure are, as stated by 
Reason himself [36], the same that sometimes lead to success. The consequence of this is that 
we cannot always consider the error as necessarily harmful.
4. Man as an essential resource for solving accidents: the rise of resilient 
systems
As a matter of fact, machines do not make mistakes as long as no unexpected events happen 
against which they are often not able to establish a viable alternative compared to the pre-set 
programme. ‘Man, then, is certainly less reliable than computers in some respects, but if the auto-
matic system goes haywire, who but man can intervene to solve an unexpected problem?’ [37].
The Apollo 13 mission has passed down in history as one of the most difficult missions of con-
quering the Moon, in which a number of malfunctions and unexpected events brought engi-
neers and crew members to make corrective actions, often without following a pre-planned 
procedure and breaching the mission protocol [38]. The genius of man, in his ability to cope 
with unforeseen problems also by committing actions that technically had been classified as 
‘mistakes’, was the key to the mission’s success, allowing him to avert disaster.
Already when the spaceship was coming out from the Earth’s orbit, there was a first danger-
ous accident. One of the five second-stage Saturn V carrier’s engines stopped working, forcing 
mission control to make the decision to use the remaining four engines longer than planned 
and thus acting contrary to the rules, in order to allow the mission to continue. Even the third-
stage rocket engine was operated beyond its capacity in order to correct the deviation from 
the trajectory that occurred after experiencing the first problem. Shortly after the successful 
lunar module docking manoeuvre, 321,860 km from Earth, one of the four oxygen tanks of 
the command and service module (CSM) exploded, causing serious damage. At this point, 
it was decided to cancel the descent on the Moon and the engineers decided to focus their 
efforts on the re-entry manoeuvres. The damaged CSM module included a command module, 
which hosted the three crew members and which was in fact the space shuttle that would have 
allowed the astronauts to return to Earth. It also contained a service module needed for the 
first module to function, which in turn housed, besides the thrusters for re-entry manoeuvres, 
even the technical equipment to allow life on board and the oxygen tanks. Such a massive 
malfunction in the service module prevented the astronauts from using the command module 
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for return to Earth, condemning them to a slow and unrelenting agony in space. However, 
because the lunar module (LEM), fortunately had already been hooked on the CSM when the 
plan was still to perform the Moon landing, it was decided to transfer the entire crew within 
the LEM and to use it to return to Earth. The lunar module, though, had been designed only 
to land and take off from the moon. As a matter of fact, once the astronauts had been allowed 
to return in the CSM, it would have been abandoned in space orbiting the Moon, having in 
fact completed its mission. The problems encountered clearly were not trivial. Everything had 
been turned upside down and the crew was now forced to navigate by sight, without relying 
on proven mission protocols. To begin with, a crew of three people was occupying a module 
that had only two seats. In addition, the module itself was preparing to face a 4-day long return 
journey to Earth, whereas it was intended to land and take-off from the Moon in a total time of 
2 days at the most. As such, all service equipment designed to allow life on board was under-
sized compared to the needs. The crew, in fact, was forced to assemble the new carbon dioxide 
filters to be installed in the LEM while orbiting and with very few tools available, considering 
that those provided were not sufficient for three people and for twice as much time than origi-
nally expected. The same engines of the LEM, which had been designed solely for landing and 
taking off from the Moon, did not guarantee success if used for different purposes, such as to 
return to Earth. These factors sparked long and exhausting discussions between the engineers 
responsible for monitoring the engines at the base in Houston. Some of them, in fact, did not 
agree to use the engines of the lunar landing module for the shuttle to return to Earth, believing 
such a manoeuvre posed a serious risk to the crew’s safety. The lunar module engines were 
specifically designed to complete the landing mission, which meant there was no guarantee 
of the mission succeeding if they had been used for different purposes. Also, when returning 
to Earth, there would have been the need to turn on these engines several times to correct the 
trajectory of the LEM, but the engines had been designed to be switched on only once during 
lift-off from the moon. Other engineers, instead, considering the serious risk of explosion in 
attempting to reignite the engines of the SEM due to the damages consequent the explosion 
of the oxygen tank, were opting for taking the risk of using the LEM’s engines. Either way, a 
decision needed to be made quickly and in the end, the decision was to authorise the use of the 
lunar module engines to return to Earth, although this operation was not contemplated in any 
of the mission’s security protocols.
The re-entry operation fortunately was a success and astronauts Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert and 
Fred Haise managed to return to Earth safe and sound.
This experience is an example of how man’s ability to cope with unexpected situations, even 
acting against protocol and therefore committing ‘errors’ compared to the original plan, can 
sometimes prove decisive for success. The group of engineers who were pending for not using 
the lunar module engines basically reasoned on a ‘rule’ level, i.e. advocating the peremptory 
enforcement of rules. The procedures said that these engines were designed for a specific pur-
pose, that there was no guarantee of success and that using them for different purposes was 
not provided for in the protocols, which means it would have been a mistake. Those who were 
in favour of using the engines applied a ‘knowledge’-based approach, that is, to use human 
intelligence to cope with the unexpected event, not following written rules, breaking some of 
them and ultimately inventing new ones.
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This experience shows how, especially for highly complex socio-technical systems, in which 
a complicated process cannot always be planned in every detail and in full compliance with a 
series of strict rules and preconceived algorithms, since the variables involved can be endless 
and as such, can easily give rise to unexpected events, man’s ability to decide to breach the 
rules can sometimes be decisive.
‘Complex systems are always in dynamic equilibrium. They seek variety because it is only 
through variety that they evolve […]; sometimes it is positive variety, i.e. ‘good’ information 
that enables the system to succeed. At other times, it will be negative information (‘error’) and 
could make the system collapse or change it’ [18]. An adaptive system, therefore, also learns 
from the negative information, which is ‘news’ that increases the system’s resilience.
We must not, however, think that to improve the reliability of a system, we have to wait for 
the occurrence of a serious accident. Improvement comes from analysing the errors, true, 
but considerably important among them, as we have seen, are latent errors, those holes in 
the system that caused minor malfunctions, weak signals for which the organisation should 
fine-tune its sensitivity to know how to recognise and correct them, capitalising on the infor-
mation it gathers from them. Thanks to a safety culture (correct self-analysis and reporting 
procedures), we can then build on the information gathered from the analysis of the system 
and consequently correct deviations, sometimes even improving the rules and considering 
new scenarios. Risk management based on fixed procedures and established practice, in other 
words based on a “static management” in which everything is pre-planned, is not able to 
represent continually evolving systems such as highly complex socio-technical ones are [39]. 
This is where the theory of ‘resilient systems’ stems from.
The term ‘resilience’, its original meaning at least, belongs to the physics of matter and means 
‘the ability of an object to regain its initial shape after undergoing a deformation caused by an 
impact’. The Help Center at the APA (American Psychologists Association) defines resilience as 
‘the process of adaptation in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy and other significant sources 
of stress’. It is therefore ‘an individual’s ability to overcome unusual circumstances of difficulty 
due to his behaviour and mental qualities of adaptation’ [40]. It means “‘finding a way out’ from 
difficult experiences” [41], in other words, find the smartest and fastest way to solve the prob-
lems. According to computer science, it is ‘the quality of a system that allows it to continue to 
function properly in the presence of faults in one or more of its constituent elements. It therefore 
indicates the system’s tolerance to faults, malfunctions and breakage’. Resilience is typical of 
high-risk organisations and their adaptive capacity is decisive against threats to the organisa-
tion’s integrity and hence, in avoiding failure [28]. Some of the main features of a resilient sys-
tem are: (revised by the publication of Steven and Sybil Wollin [42]; drawn from Fichera [28]):
1. Insight: that is, the system’s ability to examine itself, i.e. to gather the information that led 
to the traumatic event, analyse the problem, know how to read the elements relating to the 
context and seek alternative solutions.
2. Independence: the ability to maintain its own identity, while not isolating itself—auton-
omy and independence, without feeling totally bound by other systems or resources that 
they are able to provide.
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3. Interaction and communication: the ability to establish satisfactory relations with its sur-
roundings, entertaining more or less close relationships that, however, if necessary allow 
to develop the system’s aim.
4. Proactivity: the system’s ability to acquire and process enough information so that it can 
read its environment consistently and use it for its own purposes.
5. Creativity: the ability to create the ‘organisation’, i.e. a new functional order starting from 
the chaotic and depressive situation following the destabilising event.
6. Humour and irony: a disposition of the person who is part of the system to break away 
from the problem by belittling its importance through a ‘language game’ that allows an 
analysis and positive re-evaluation of the event.
7. Ethics: refers to the ability to feel part of a macro socio-political system and share its values 
and dynamics.
To clarify the meaning of the unique aspects of resilient systems, we will contextualise their 
underlying principles below. First of all, we ought to point out that it would be enough to 
effectively implement the principle of insight to achieve substantial improvements in the 
vast majority of cases in terms of the organisation’s reliability at large. The system’s abil-
ity to examine itself, to find elements that may have caused or led to the errors, lies in this 
principle. There are a number of methods to practically implement these analyses, but the 
starting point is always the systematic collection of information. Unfortunately, organisations 
are often lacking a valid system for the collection of data that are useful to monitoring their 
behaviour. Collecting data, in fact, is costly, both in terms of time and resources. It is also a 
boring job, which is often done by people who normally are engaged in other tasks and con-
sider the needs to fill out forms and records as waste of time that hinders their job. Hence, 
records are often not kept or are filed only partially and sometimes retrospectively, trying to 
trace the chain of events and approximating most of the information they contain. A resilient 
system, instead, needs data and must be able to identify, through a careful analysis of the 
key elements inherent in the dynamics of the system itself, the strategic information deemed 
necessary for its implementation, and trying then to systematise and possibly standardise and 
computerise the data collected. If we were to make a comparison with organisations operat-
ing in aviation, it would be like having a black box for each event that occurred. In the event 
of a system malfunction, therefore, it would be enough to draw information from recordings 
of the events to get a clearer picture of what happened, and accordingly establishing what 
should be the improvement actions to be implemented to ensure that the event no longer 
occurs.
This requires that all the system’s resources are aware of the importance of participating 
actively in this collection of information, especially by establishing reporting elements that can 
be easily filed (preferably electronic) and that mention the key data as to what is taking place 
within the environment in which the resource operates. Ultimately, it is necessary that the sys-
tem is able to identify the crucial points that require a record of the events, such as the correct 
filing of a medical record, but also records about data that is helpful in analysing the timing 
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of the process, the results achieved vs. those budgeted and customer complaints or ones filed 
by other stakeholders, rather than reports on so-called near misses. Implementing the above 
enables the system to collect valuable data about its operation, but alone is not enough. It is 
equally important that the system has the resources and skills necessary to effectively analyse 
the collected records whenever it is necessary to investigate an adverse event or when we want 
to tap into statistical data that can help improve it. This is linked to the principle of proactivity, 
another feature typical of resilient systems.
Proactivity means moving ahead of events, predicting what will happen in the future through 
a careful analysis of what happened in the past. What has happened in the past is represented 
by a set of records, but it is then necessary that within individual organisations, operating 
units are established/implemented that will analyse and process the collected data and that 
are able to draw information from the records that is useful to achieve improvement. In fact, 
what would be the point of collecting and analysing such a huge amount of information if 
we then did not act to solve the problems identified? To do this, the organisation needs to 
have a unit that works as much as possible in contact with the individual departments and 
not only at a centralised level, in order to be able to thoroughly understand its needs and the 
singularities associated with the individual processes. It is then necessary that the unit be 
able to critically analyse the results of monitoring the process indicators, suggest solutions for 
improvement that are valid and applicable but above all, communicate effectively with those 
who then will have to take the necessary decisions and authorise the actions proposed. The 
system must ultimately be able to operate according to the logic and principles of total quality 
management, where a ‘senior management’ periodically reviews all information collected by 
individual ‘process owners’ through a set of business process ‘indicators’ appropriately cho-
sen to monitor the system and take proactive actions aimed at achieving ‘continual improve-
ment’ of the organisation.
The concept of ‘independence’ of a resilient system is less agreeable, as it apparently conflicts 
with what is happening in the world today. In fact, we live in an increasingly globalised world 
where each subject, whether we are talking about a country, organisation or market, is increas-
ingly linked to the existence of others, because it constantly requires interaction and support. 
While recognising in the clustering effect of globalisation an indisputable advantage when it 
comes to streamlining resources, it is important that the ‘satellite’ organisation, whichever that 
may be, preserve its own identity within the macro system in which it operates and especially 
the possibility to manage the resources necessary for its operation as much as possible inde-
pendently. The implementation of the above makes the organisation accountable and more 
prone to engage in ensuring the productivity of what it produces, in essence making it directly 
responsible for the success or failure, avoiding the fear of belittling the recognition of success 
and conversely discouraging the idea of being able to impute to others the causes of its failure. 
These aspects tied to autonomy and independence are the same that act at the level of the 
individual and that greatly influence his behaviour, making him more participatory or other-
wise unresponsive towards the organisation. Systems that give incentives and reward perfor-
mance, when combined with guaranteed freedom of action and thought, stimulate creativity 
and innovation, which are the basic ingredients of resilient systems. Independence, however, 
should not prevent the system from ‘interacting and communicating’ with its surroundings, 
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or with other units of the same system or with other organisations. We find an example of how 
communication is implemented within a complex organisation to limit the occurrence of errors 
in healthcare organisations. A hospital, in fact, must be able to accommodate its patients and 
receive their relatives, limiting as much as possible situations of uneasiness and interacting 
with them with professionalism and competence, but also frankly and politely. In this regard, 
there are, for example, several hospitals that use different colours in the hallways and wards 
to help visitors find the correct path to follow. With reference to communication between the 
medical/nursing staff and patients, conversely, specialised courses on communication tech-
niques are becoming increasingly popular and are especially effective in cases where there is 
a need to communicate with clarity and professionalism and even with discretion and tact. As 
for internal communication between members of the same system, it is now a known fact that 
it is at the core of the ‘best management’ of any organisation. Any system consisting of more 
than one individual needs to ensure the effective delivery of information between the differ-
ent individuals that are a part of it. In this respect, an example of the procedures that some 
organisations have adopted to facilitate the exchange of information is to have the shifts of 
incoming and outgoing personnel slightly overlap. This favours the chances for colleagues to 
meet physically in short briefing sessions to exchange information on what happened during 
the previous shift. Some abnormal events, in fact, might have changed the system’s conditions 
compared to ordinary ones, and as such involve the need to communicate the changes to a 
colleague. The architectural design of the working environment should then promote the logic 
of briefing, providing an enabling environment where workers can organise such meetings.
Creativity is perhaps the true essence of resilient systems. Whenever an adverse event tends 
to destabilise a system, the latter’s resilience opposes failure by generating the necessary self-
defence mechanisms necessary for its survival. This is the case for example of emergencies or 
situations that diverge from those imagined, for which, as we have seen already, the resource 
does not have the time or ability to apply the protocol as planned. In these cases, creativity, 
both personal and of the work team, has a role at the level of ‘knowledge’, leveraging their 
prior knowledge and its own intelligence to resolve situations not attributable to familiar con-
texts. It is important, however, that when these circumstances occur, we are able to capitalise 
on the information resulting from those circumstances, treasuring them and exploiting them 
if necessary to change the rules for the organisation to function. In the air force, for example, 
as well as in Formula 1 or motorcycle racing, at the end of each qualifying lap or race, driv-
ers are used to meeting up to review together with the engineers, team managers or personal 
coach how the events unfolded, analysing them, exchanging opinions and information and 
ultimately learning new scenarios that may occur again in the future. A critical analysis of 
these events allows them to make the right ‘corrections’ to the system, capitalising the infor-
mation received and encouraging its growth.
Humour and irony are two characteristics of resilient systems that refer to the individual more 
than the system as a whole. As previously mentioned, they are actions meant to enable a break-
away from the problem by belittling it through an analysis that can lead to a positive re-eval-
uation of the accident. Being able to apply humour and irony to a problem is something that 
pertains to the psychological framework of each of us and refers to our ability to address the 
problem with a positive attitude, knowing the pitfalls, but without being overly intimidated 
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by them. In borderline cases, breaking away from the problem results in what we call ‘cold 
blood’, that is, the person’s ability to exorcise the problem preventing it from overpowering 
him and thus throw him into a state of panic and as such, hindering his ability to react effec-
tively. The right attitude to deal with situations that involve high emotional stress sometimes 
stems from innate personal aptitudes, but more often than not these skills can be learned, fol-
lowing the advice of more experienced staff and participating in training courses and simula-
tions. Everybody knows about the widespread use of flight simulators in aviation, aids that are 
useful to teach the trainee pilot how to cope with unexpected situations, sometimes pushing 
him to the limits of what is solvable and getting him used to situations where it is necessary to 
maintain the proper concentration and cold blood. Even in the medical field, emergencies in the 
emergency room require staff on site possessing the same skills, both technical and in terms of 
aptitude. For this reason, even among medical staffs, in recent years, realistic simulation tech-
niques have become more and more popular in the training of doctors and nurses. For example, 
the spread of sophisticated mannequins, able to emulate what could happen in real emergency 
situations, get used them to developing the ability to cope, with the required preparation and 
with all due ‘detachment’, to emergencies they will likely find themselves handling in their job.
It would also be desirable, although hardly feasible, that coordinators know how to identify 
within each organisation, the resources that are most predisposed to operate in situations 
involving high emotional stress. This is the case, for example, in the choice of emergency 
response personnel. Doing so would enhance the possibility of establishing, even within a 
same shift, a team of people who can work together, each supporting the other’s idiosyncra-
sies, as happens in operating units of the armed forces, where everyone has their own role 
determined by referring not only to the individual’s aspirations, but also to what are his skills 
and abilities to take action.
Ultimately, ethics represents that additional property of resilient systems of defining its 
own values and policies shared by all its members. Ethics ultimately is part of the concept 
of ‘corporate policy’, which has always been among the cornerstones of quality management 
systems that have nowadays become the standard. It recalls the need for the organisation 
to define, inform and especially share with all of the system’s members the principles that 
inspire and guide the business, both internally and within the social context in which it oper-
ates. The pivotal point of this principle is contained in the following question: how can we 
expect rules and procedures to be followed if those who are called to do so do not agree with 
the strategies and policies that have generated them?
The principle should be familiar to those who deal with security and prevention and its 
essence can be clearly explained by the following example. If we were called upon to ensure 
that the staffs of our operating unit wear a helmet, rather than fasten their seat belts or pro-
ceed according to our instructions, we could act by enforcing corporate security procedures 
requiring staffs to comply with these requirements. We also could define the penalties appli-
cable for those who fail to perform as required, and ultimately, we could ensure efficient 
surveillance, checking that everyone behaves as prescribed.
All this would not be as effective in assuring us the expected results as being certain that our 
unit really agrees with the need to resort to the safeguards we have devised to avoid damaging 
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repercussions for their own safety. This is what we refer to as a ‘safety culture’, i.e. endors-
ing certain convictions, certain principles, certain values of our own and, therefore, behaving 
accordingly, in accordance with the procedures given, not because they have been imposed on 
us, but because we are aware of their actual effectiveness.
5. Human error and the ability of the system to limit it: correlation 
between man-machine-environment
Man, as it turns out, is the main resource we need to focus on to improve the reliability of the 
organisation; through him, it evolves and becomes capable of coping with unexpected events, 
thus reducing the likelihood of making mistakes. It is, therefore, essential that man be put in 
the position to be able to operate at his best, taking advantage of his strengths and limiting the 
consequences of his weaknesses. Human error is commonly referred to as a ‘performance that 
deviates from a prescribed and specified sequence of actions’ [43]. And properly handling 
human error is, after all, a difficult and delicate operation, because the whole operation of 
fully securing a system depends on it.
To understand how the system can limit the occurrence of human error, we must go back to 
its genesis, i.e. retrace the process that starts with man’s thought and leads to the execution 
of an action.
Jens Rasmussen in 1983 proposed a classification of human behaviour [44], in which he illus-
trates a model that is still used today as a basis for understanding the genesis of human errors 
and for accordingly implementing appropriate actions in trying to limit them.
According to Rasmussen, human behaviour can be broken down into three different types:
• skill-based behaviour,
• rule-based behaviour, and
• knowledge-based behaviour.
‘Skill-based behaviours’ are automatic behaviours that the subject has already acquired and 
that he therefore has fully mastered. They include actions that man carries out without hav-
ing to think or reason about them, nor pay particular attention to during their execution. For 
example, brushing our teeth, tying our shoes or pressing the brake of a car are all behaviours 
acquired and implemented automatically, which do not require special attention or concen-
tration. In this case, an error in their execution, as indicated by J. Reason in his book Human 
Error, 1990 [30] happens simply because of carelessness (slips) or forgetfulness (lapses). The 
person who performs the action automatically makes a mistake not because he does not know 
how to respond properly to the situation or cannot remember how to perform the task, but 
simply because he is momentarily distracted. No grown man and in full mental and physical 
capacity, in fact, needs to make it a point of remembering to fasten his shoes, let alone follow 
a particular procedure to remember how to do that. However, we may sometimes leave the 
house with our shoes untied.
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‘Rule-based behaviours’, instead, are behaviours for which the person is acting according to a 
rule, whether it be a procedure, practice or regulation. He, therefore, focuses on carrying out 
actions in the way he has been instructed. The error in this case can be determined by lack of 
knowledge of the rule (‘mistakes’), which thus leads to a wrong action. For example, if a fault 
indicator of a plant is switched on but the operator does not remember or recognise its signifi-
cance, he may not implement the proper corrective action. This error, attributable to man as its 
mere executor, however, is not to be confused with the error that might take place if we were 
to follow a procedure correctly and nonetheless end up with nefarious results. In this case, in 
fact, although the behaviour of man is still based on rules, it turned out to be wrong as it is the 
very procedure that is wrong. Therefore, the mistake will not affect the person who made it, 
but rather the person(s) who invented the rule.
Finally, ‘knowledge-based behaviours’ concern actions in which the subject is faced with situ-
ations completely or partially unknown to him and must implement predetermined choices 
to address them, relying on his knowledge of this kind of situation or, in other words, draw-
ing from his cultural and personal experiences. This is the case of innovation or of unexpected 
events, situations in which, as already seen, only man’s ability to making choices that break 
the mode can be decisive and lead to success.
The consequences of these distinctions are numerous and it is therefore important that the 
organisation knows how to recognise them, in order to help its members execute actions in 
harmony with the system that surrounds them. We have repeatedly hinted that knowledge 
of the ‘rule’ by the worker is an effective weapon in preventing mistakes. The system designs 
procedures and work practices, planning their goals, implementing rules for their execu-
tion, the resources to be used, the timing of implementation and identifying and correcting 
possible deficiencies over time. Therefore, assuming that the system has generated a correct 
procedure and assuming that no unforeseen changes have occurred to change its validity or 
jeopardise its results, a worker properly trained on how to execute it should not make mis-
takes. However, we know that in reality, this is not always true. There are multiple causes 
to errors, but one of the most common lies in the worker shifting in attitude from a ‘rule-
based’ to a ‘skill-based’ behaviour. As time progresses, especially for those routine actions 
that the worker carries out automatically and without having to think about them that much, 
his threshold of attention in tackling them lowers, leaving room for possible distractions that 
could induce him to make the mistake. When it comes to driving a car, for example, we carry 
out a series of routine actions in sequence, like closing the doors, putting the transmission into 
neutral or engaging the clutch, turning the key, or disengaging the parking brake. No one, 
except for novice drivers, runs over what he has to do or how to do it before carrying out the 
task, but carries it out automatically. Sometimes, though, we will start the car without disen-
gaging the brake or without closing the door.
How can the system limit these distractions?
The answers are varied and are found in how the human brain works. It is well known, in 
fact, that the brain cannot process all the information surrounding it with the same attention 
span, and to avoid being overwhelmed, it tends to ignore the information it believes is unnec-
essary or of secondary importance. Routine behaviours, precisely because they demand less 
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concentration of the brain, run the risk of receiving less attention, especially if an external 
stimulus, intended as a distracting event, is introduced and ‘seizes’ the brain’s attention. After 
all, if we think about it, the human brain needs to feel stimulated. Contrary to what happens, 
for example, in the CPU of a computer, which can work even for hours at very low utilisa-
tion rates, the human brain tends to always work within an optimum range of ‘engagement’. 
If we overload it with information, it will get tired and will tend to lose track of some of the 
information, but on the contrary, if we do not engage it enough, it will look for other stimuli, 
focusing the attention elsewhere and trying to process other information from the surround-
ing environment. If the other information it finds does not stimulate it enough, the brain will 
draw from its own memory and emotions, ultimately generating those mental processes that 
we call thoughts, or more correctly refer to as overthinking, understood as mental processes 
that stray from the context and that are distracting.
The strategy, therefore, is to help man maintain a high level of attention on what he is doing, 
trying to not overload him with information that might wear him out, but at the same time 
preventing that the information become ordinary, dull, or uninspiring, with the risk that the 
brain lowers the level of concentration, ultimately leaving room for distractions. Workplaces, 
machines or infrastructure should therefore be designed to require that the resources that use 
them keep a level of attention above the minimal threshold that leads to their distraction. An 
example is the design of highways, in which the tendency has long been, whenever possible, 
to avoid long stretches of road on a straight path. In fact, such straight and long stretches 
make driving monotonous and thus are likely to distract drivers, including gentle curves, 
although not necessary for purely technical reasons, engages the brain more actively, forcing 
it to concentrate on the road.
Very popular are also cases where the worker is forced to act in accordance with ‘rule-based’ 
behaviours, thus avoiding the risk of the tasks becoming routine and instinctive at the root. 
Such is the case, for instance, of the growing use of technical checklists like those used in 
aviation before take-off. The peremptory inspection of all piloting and emergency devices 
executed in accordance with a list of points addressing the tasks that need to be performed 
undoubtedly lowers the likelihood of errors, which in this case are due not only to possible 
distractions but especially to forgetfulness. In this regard, however, there is a need to be cau-
tious and to resort to the use of the checklist only when they are actually necessary, limiting 
the list of steps to follow. A disproportionate use of checklists beyond what are the real needs 
would lead man to consider them overly long, boring and probably of little use, and therefore 
not to apply them with due care and thus reducing their positive effects.
In other cases, the working environment or the machine is designed to ‘physically impose’ 
to the person who works there (or who operates the machine) that he act in compliance with 
the safety standards designed by the system, preventing him from making mistakes. One 
example is the safety lever on hydraulic excavators that disables movement of the excava-
tion arm. It is located on the side of the driver’s seat, forcing the worker to raise it physically 
in order to climb out of the machine. Or the drive control of some industrial presses that is 
twofold and installed at a distance, which forces the operator to use both hands to operate the 
press, forcing him to keep them away from the danger zone.
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Sometimes the mistakes man makes due to distractions involve involuntary movements, 
such as bumping into an object or inadvertently operating a command. In the case of the use 
of machinery and work equipment, a standard practice to avoid such mistakes is to design 
controls with ‘double consent’. These controls require that the worker carry out at least two 
actions in sequence in order to operate the device, thus avoiding involuntary actions.
The above examples help us understand just how crucial it is that the whole production 
system, starting with the design of the working environment, as well as the machinery and 
equipment installed within it, takes into due account the needs of man, in order to help him 
carry out the actions without leading him into error. The working environment accordingly is 
moulded around the needs of the individual, promoting (as we have mentioned) his strengths 
and minimising his weaknesses. Knowing the causes that lead to human error is also crucial 
when planning the best corrective action. As we have seen, one of the key prerequisites for 
improving the corporate safety is to educate and inform employees on performing the right 
action, in other words, they should always know ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do’. But in cases 
where, for example, an expert nurse needs to perform a blood test without having previously 
disinfected the patient’s skin, it would be entirely useless to impose that she attends another 
training course. Her behaviour in performing the blood test, in fact, is ‘skill-based’, so that 
only her inattention or forgetfulness may have caused the failure, and certainly not a lack of 
knowledge of the rule.
Errors due to ‘violations’, instead, i.e. where man purposely carries out a wrong action, break-
ing the rules, are a whole different subject. Violations essentially can be broken down into: 
‘routine’, ‘necessary’, or ‘due to wilful misconduct’ [30]. Aside from these, which are inten-
tional, that is, made by a person who is fully aware of their outcomes, which is sometimes 
disastrous, and that involve deliberately acting against the rules, ‘routine’ violations are known 
both to workers and supervisors/managers and are normally ‘accepted’ by the system, as they 
are sometimes deemed useful to optimise/accelerate the execution of an action. The violation 
is also not viewed as possibly impairing the system’s operation or as really increasing the risk 
to the worker. A routine violation, in fact, is always linked to its perpetrator (more or less) 
underestimating its consequences, both in terms of the probability of its occurrence and of the 
damage. A routine violation is a ‘short cut’, a way to simplify a rule which is seen as unneces-
sary, because it is considered too complex to be respected/redundant or overly cautionary to 
be complied with in full. Removing a crankcase from a machine just for speeding up work 
operations, not using personal protective equipment against falls from a height considering 
the occurrence unlikely, or not wearing a seatbelt only because uncomfortable, are some of the 
many examples that lead man to expose himself to the risk, breaking the safety rules.
One of the best strategies applied to avoid these violations is that of ‘setting the example’, 
especially by employees who have a role of responsibility in the company. Man, in fact, tends 
to emulate others and modifies his behaviour based on the example set by others, be it posi-
tive or negative. In other words, he acts in tune with what is considered the standard practice 
within the system, often regardless of the behaviour expected of a rule. If, for instance, we were 
to transfer some workers operating in a virtuous system and who diligently follow the rules to 
a similar system that is not as virtuous and where transgression, instead, is the norm, many of 
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them after a certain time would begin to conform to the new system, breaking the rules. The 
system should then set the example, encouraging the appropriate behavior of its resources, 
also through the use of rewards for proper conduct and not merely punishing transgressors. In 
this way, each of the system’s components will receive fair recognition for his work and will be 
driven to apply its virtuous behavior, advancing the entire organisation.
The urge to break a rule not only stems from considering it overly cautious or not fully agree-
ing with its purpose, but also often stems from benefits (sometimes even financial) for the 
company or, as we have already seen, for some stakeholders within the system. However, 
we need to consider that the ‘normalisation of deviance’—the process that generates a steady 
erosion of standard procedures, where minor violations and irregularities are accepted and 
tolerated, in the long run could prove destructive to the system’s integrity. In the absence of 
accidents, in fact, these deviations will become ‘normalised’ and part of the routine. This will 
lead to people within the system slipping into danger without being fully aware of it.
Such is the case, for instance, of ‘reverential bows’, which have become famous after the tragic 
events that involved the cruise ship Costa Concordia, which on 13 January 2012, helmed by 
Captain Francesco Schettino, while preparing to perform a flyby along the coast, hit a reef off 
the island of Giglio and flipped over on its side, causing the deaths of 32 people [45]. I do not 
want to make direct references to the case in question, in which the trial ended with the convic-
tion of Captain Schettino, whom the Court judged to be the sole person responsible for the hei-
nous choice to perform a dangerous manoeuvre for selfish reasons alone. However, multiple 
sources report that this ill-considered action was not the only one of its kind in the history of 
navigation, but on the contrary, as many witnesses confirm, would seem to be a widespread 
practice. The reasons that may lead a ship captain to make a ‘bow’ are not exclusive to a par-
ticular type of person. For some, the motivation is strictly personal, i.e. the desire to sail near 
the places where he was born or grew up or where his loved ones live. For others, it is simply 
the taste of doing something daring, while some people suggest that economic interests spur 
some ship captains, for whom the majestic view on a cruise ship just a few metres from the 
shore offers considerable publicity. The fact is that one or more parts of the system are driven to 
make a potentially risky manoeuvre, reassured in their choices by what we already called ‘nor-
malisation of deviance’. The management thought that transgressing the rule was possible and 
that the outcome of their actions was well worth, determining only a little increase of the risk, 
considered wrongly to be minimal and controllable. The story of the Costa Concordia, instead, 
sadly reminds us that the often positive outcomes of risky behaviours should not lead us to 
consider them as legitimate. The fact that we often avoided disaster must not lead to an accep-
tance of the risk. Approving risky behaviours to pursue personal agendas, in fact, produces 
countless negative effects: ‘it damages the culture of safety; it stretches the boundaries of the 
risk; it increases the tolerance of errors that do not cause damage; it increases the level of accep-
tance of risks in favour of interests tied with efficiency and productivity; it ultimately leads the 
safety system down a slippery slope in which accidents are increasingly possible’ [46].
Ultimately, ‘necessary’ violations, as we have seen, involve a deliberate and motivated steer-
ing away from a well-devised procedure because the actual conditions make it impossible to 
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follow or lead us, after meticulous thought, to prefer different solutions. Apart from the case 
of the Apollo mission that we discussed earlier, in which the head of the mission authorised 
the use of propulsion systems to return to Earth against protocol because in the given state 
of emergency, this solution was the only means of salvation; if we again consider the case of 
the Costa Concordia, it is important to note how the manoeuvre made by Captain Schettino 
immediately after the disaster, which was to dock the ship on a rocky reef just North of the 
port of Giglio, although such a manoeuvre was not contemplated in the emergency proce-
dures, ended up facilitating rescue operations, avoiding to have to perform them in open sea, 
with all the consequences that would have involved. The impressive gash on the left side of 
the ship, in fact, would have caused it to sink, considering that as many as five compartments 
had filled up with water (while protocol established three at the most). ‘Necessary’ violations, 
in short, occur whenever an unexpected event occurs, i.e. in those conditions where time, the 
context’s conditions and compelling necessity impose a breach of protocol, which, therefore, 
in that moment is seen as inadequate, leading us to prefer unplanned actions that are the fruit 
of the ‘knowledge’ of the person who carries them out. These violations represent a ‘treasure’ 
that must be capitalised by the organisation, whether or not they lead to the mission’s success. 
Every time that ‘necessary’ violations occur, the organisation must ask itself how it got to that 
point, what did not work, what it failed to forecast, and what did not go according to plan. 
Consequently, one or more briefings after the event will allow it to evaluate the pros and cons 
of the actions that broke the rules and will ensure that the organisation can learn from the situ-
ation by improving and implementing its own rules and procedures, and as such, displaying 
that proactive behaviour that is typical of resilient systems.
6. Error reporting incentives: the importance of communication and 
information-sharing at all levels
The currently most credited method for improving the level of safety in an organisation is to 
push human resources to encourage error reporting as the only way to reduce those latent 
factors that, if not corrected early on, can lead to serious consequences for the system, causing 
potential accidents.
This perspective, as it turns out, is based on the idea that accidents are seldom caused by a 
single event, be it technological or generated by human error, but more often by a chain of 
events related to past failures inherent in the system, designed and built by man, and there-
fore in itself just as fallible.
In aviation, it is estimated that for every serious accident or catastrophically damaging event, 
no less than 30 inconveniences of medium importance occur, and these correspond to no less 
than 600 minor inconveniences [47]. Therefore, since the catastrophic accident always origi-
nates from a broad base of malfunctions and minor inconveniences, if we could provide the 
system with a tool capable of having a sizeable impact on basic malfunctions, we could drasti-
cally reduce the overall number of catastrophic events. It is vital therefore that anyone at any 
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level and whatever his role within the organisation is committed to pursuing an active par-
ticipation on flagging any malfunctions or errors discovered in their job, not underestimating 
the consequences that they can generate in the dynamics of events leading up to the failure.
Latent errors, understood as malfunctioning technology, are often overlooked, especially 
when the error has not produced harmful consequences for the system. There are several 
reasons why this happens, but they all involve underestimating the possible consequences of 
the malfunction, both in terms of the probability that it can generate a loss and the magnitude 
of that loss. There is also often a generalised ‘laziness’ on the part of the system’s members in 
reporting what they know, especially if they were not directly involved with what happened, 
thus preventing the organisation to solve the problem.
Therefore, sometimes minor malfunctions due to wear and tear, flawed materials, or lack 
of experience in controls or repairs, such as a broken mirror, a worn rope, a burnt-out LED 
or a protective cover that was not reassembled on the machine, are not given the due atten-
tion, leaving minor latent and potentially harmful bugs within the system. Man, on top of it 
all, has the extraordinary, but in this case, has counterproductive ability to adapt quickly to 
mutations in the surrounding environment. After a while, malfunctions, bugs, or errors are 
no longer being perceived as potentially dangerous: we get used to them, we no longer notice 
them. However, it remains inherent in the system, ready to take part in the chain of events 
that could lead to a failure.
Experience also shows, especially in the case of human errors, that they are often concealed by 
the person who committed them, or by people who are aware of another person’s errors, in a 
logic of avoiding negative repercussions or sanctions.
Unfortunately, faulty actions, understood as potentially dangerous mistakes made by 
man and that have harmful repercussions for the system, are often dealt with by apply-
ing only a logic of punishing the action to solve the problem. The organisation seeks to 
single-out the culprit, as he is considered the only person responsible for what happened, 
as the last actor in the process or action that led to the error. The search for the culprit 
also triggers a natural defensive stance by the person who ‘made the mistake’, who will 
tend to hide the actions for fear of being punished. In this culture of blame, someone who 
says, ‘I was wrong’, is as if he were admitting that ‘I am wrong’ [2], essentially claiming 
to be allegedly unfit to be part of a system in which he sees himself as a possible cause of 
failure.
The person guilty of making the mistake consequently has a poorly constructive attitude or 
one that is not constructive at all in resolving the issue, because he feels responsible and 
vulnerable, fearing the loss of esteem by his colleagues. He thinks he has betrayed the orga-
nization’s trust, so he will do everything he can for hiding his responsibility, hampering the 
analysis of what happened and consequently the possibility for the system to solve the prob-
lem. The culture of isolation and punishment of culprits, therefore, does not generate those 
organisational defences that help solve the failure, but instead encourages the adoption of 
defensive behaviours that are often inappropriate.
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In this regard, the official report by Edgar Cortright on the causes of the explosion of the 
oxygen tank during the Apollo 13 mission, we discussed earlier, made it clear that it was 
generated by an impact that the tank had suffered 2 years before when performing certain 
maintenance tasks. As a matter of fact, the report specifies that the inconvenience had been 
duly reported in the maintenance records, but that it had been judged to be of minor impor-
tance. The records, in fact, referred to a ‘slight collision’, playing down the consequences that 
it might have on the proper functioning of the tank.
It is unclear whether the collision was indeed ‘slight’ nor as to what was the basis for judg-
ing it as such, but the fact is that it is certain that it was the origin of the malfunction, having 
caused damage inside the tank. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether a more alarming 
report than one downplaying the seriousness of the inconvenience by maintenance staff as to 
what had really happened would have alerted more the engineers in charge of the operating 
unit, inducing them to further inspect the possible damage suffered by the tank. The dynam-
ics of the events suggest that the staff assigned to maintenance or to transport the tank, feeling 
somehow responsible for the mistake, acted in the logic of downplaying what happened for 
fear of negative repercussions from the organisation.
Even in the previously mentioned case of the Costa Concordia ship, the dynamics of the 
events could have had less serious consequences if communication errors had not been made 
when handling the emergency. Captain Schettino repeatedly pointed out during the trial that, 
following the collision with the rock and the order that followed to shut the watertight com-
partments, nobody had been able to tell him exactly how many of them were flooded. The 
investigation later clarified that the flooded compartments were five, while recordings of the 
conversations between the captain and the crew members responsible for their control stated 
only three. The difference, as we have already seen, is not trivial, because with only three 
compartments flooded, the ship would not have sunk.
During the investigations carried out by the magistracy, it was later revealed that one of the 
crew members, during a wiretap following the accident, told a friend that he realised that 
water was leaking from one of the hatches he was supposed to monitor. This important piece 
of information, for reasons that have not been clarified yet, did not reach the bridge, causing 
a delay in the implementation of the evacuation procedures.
The dissemination of knowledge at all levels, though, is not important only in an emergency 
or when a malfunction or unusual circumstance is uncovered; it is an effective weapon also in 
reducing injuries during the system’s normal operation. On the other hand, this is something 
that is well-known in the air force, where the systematic exchange of information and flight 
experiences by organising regular meetings at the end of a drill involving not only the pilots 
directly participating in the mission, but also all the other squad members or at times, even 
members of other units, significantly contributes to the dissemination of knowledge. This 
allows the system to learn by itself based on the mistakes made, consequently fostering the 
development of that new wealth of knowledge that enables it to self-implement and become 
more efficient and safer.




Safety management in highly complex socio-technical systems cannot be narrowed down 
to merely comply with corporate procedures and regulations, assuming they are well-struc-
tured, or even regular inspections and maintenance on plants, machinery and equipment. It is 
rather the result of a synergy of all the system’s components, both human and technological, 
whose interaction, based on shared process objectives and strategies, is an essential prereq-
uisite to ensure its success. Every element that can play a part at any level in creating the risk 
must be taken into account, starting from the human resources.
It is therefore necessary that the working environment is designed to meet the needs of man, 
bearing in mind his weaknesses or carelessness, fatigue, or stress, factors that can lead him 
to make a mistake. But at the same time, he must be put in the conditions of exploiting his 
strengths, stimulating his creative and decision-making qualities in implementing the system 
and managing accidents. The latter, moreover, are always present in highly complex systems, 
which evolve and change their conditions because they driven to innovation and progress.
Therefore, it is necessary that the organisation can recognise them and correct them promptly, 
especially when it comes to small anomalies that have not yet demonstrated their potential for 
damage, capitalising on the information it has received and at times, managing to improve the 
rules and considering new scenarios.
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